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who are the proper defendants when the 
suit is based on the absence of policy? 
The Butterfield appeal followed the 
dismissal of the second of two pro se 
complaints Butterfield filed a year apart. 
In the interim between Butterfield’s 
cases, South Dakota hired a consultant 
to help it “draft” transgender policy: 
Cynthia Osborne (who should be 
familiar to the transgender prisoner 
bar). After Butterfield’s first case was 
dismissed, Osborne went to South 
Dakota at the state’s request. She met 
with officials and interviewed several 
inmates, including Butterfield. 
Osborne issued a Report on 
Butterfield, finding “severe” gender 
dysphoria and recommending hormone 
therapy. South Dakota concealed the 
Osborne report and its recommendations 
from Butterfield, as it continued to deny 
her grievances requesting hormones. 
This writer did not learn of the Osborne 
report until after briefing, when its 
findings almost jumped off the page. 
The Court of Appeals granted 
a motion to enlarge the Butterfield 
record to include the Osborne report. 
Although it was discussed at length at 
oral argument, there is no reference 
to it in the appellate decision. During 
this appeal, two other things happened: 
Butterfield was released, and South 
Dakota adopted a transgender policy. 
Butterfield has a monetary claim for 
damages that survives, because the 
dismissal that was affirmed is without 
prejudice. The § 1983 limitations 
period in South Dakota is three years, 
and Butterfield was never given benefit 
of treatment under the new “policy.” 
She is free to sue based on denial of 
treatment and the state’s deception 
with the Osborne report. Exhaustion of 
administrative remedies and other rules 
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
do not apply to a new case filed after a 
prisoner is released, even if the events 
underlying the case arose in prison. Doe 
v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 
924 (8th Cir. 1998). ■
William Rold is a civil rights attorney 
in NYC and a former judge. He 
previously represented the American Bar 
Association on the National Commission 
for Correctional Health Care.
In a trio of decisions issued on 
January 11, the Colorado Supreme Court 
revised the state’s common law marriage 
rules to reflect the many changes that 
have occurred since it last dealt with 
this topic comprehensively in 1987 in 
People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660 (Colo. 
1987). In Hogsett v. Neale, 2021 WL 
79536, and LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 WL 
79532, the court dealt with same-sex 
couples in divorce proceedings, while 
in the third case, In re Estate of Yudkin, 
2021 WL 79542, the court dealt with 
a dispute between an intestate man’s 
ex-wife and his alleged common law 
wife as to whom should be appointed 
administrator of the estate. Justice 
Monica Marquez wrote the opinions 
for the court. There were concurring 
and dissenting opinions in the cases of 
the same-sex couples, and concurrences 
in Yudkin. This report will focus on 
Hogsett v. Neale and LaFleur v. Pyfer, 
the cases involving same-sex couples. In 
Yudkin, the court remanded so the trial 
court could apply the newly-announced 
analysis to determine whether the ex-
wife or the alleged common law wife 
your be appointed administrator. 
Justice Marquez referred to Hogsett 
as the “lead opinion” of the three, 
since it focused on an issue common 
to all three: what factors should a 
court consider in determining whether 
there was a common law marriage? 
LaFleur focuses on an issue not 
contested in Hogsett: whether the 
Obergefell marriage equality decision 
can be applied “retroactively” to find 
a common law marriage was formed 
many years before Obergefell was 
decided?
Edi L. Hogsett and Marcia E. 
Neale were in a long-term relationship 
beginning in November 2001 and never 
formally married. Same-sex marriages 
became available in Colorado through 
judicial ruling in October 2014. The 
women jointly filed a pro se petition for 
dissolution of a claimed common law 
marriage in January 2015. “The parties 
mediated a separation agreement 
stating that they had entered a common 
law marriage on December 1, 2002, and 
that their marriage was irretrievably 
broken,” wrote Justice Marquez. At 
a status conference, the trial judge 
explained that the court would have 
to determine that a marriage existed 
before it could address the petition for 
dissolution, but the parties decided that 
rather than go through that process, they 
would stipulate to dismissal as they had 
“fully settled all issues” through the 
mediation process. 
But later Hogsett “sought certain 
retirement assets and maintenance she 
believed Neale owed her under their 
separation agreement,” to which Neale 
responded that “no marriage existed 
between them.” Hogsett then filed a 
new petition for dissolution and Neale 
moved to dismiss, claiming the parties 
had no common law marriage. The trial 
judge agreed with Neale. Although 
finding that it could recognize a 
common law same-sex marriage 
predating Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 
U.S. 644 (2015), the court found that 
the Lucero factors and the trial record 
would not support a conclusion that 
there was a mutual agreement to marry, 
and the court of appeals affirmed, 
finding that although Hogsett may 
have thought she was married and the 
women had cohabitated, Neale had 
never acknowledge agreeing to marry 
Hogsett, even though there was an 
informal exchange of rings at a gay bar, 
although not any ceremony with invited 
guests at that time. The court of appeals 
did not reject the trial court’s holding 
that it was possible to contract a same-
sex common law marriage prior to 
Obergefell but accepted the trial judge’s 
finding that the mutuality required to 
find such a legal relationship was lacking 
on this record. One of the appeals 
Colorado Supreme Court Revises 
Common Law Marriage Rules to Reflect 
Social Change and Same-Sex Marriages
By Arthur S. Leonard
February 2021   LGBT Law Notes   9
judges argued, however, that common 
law marriage was an anachronism 
and that the Colorado Supreme Court 
should abolish the doctrine in that state. 
(Justice Marquez notes in her opinions 
that Colorado is one of only nine states 
[plus the District of Columbia] that still 
recognize the formation of common 
law marriages, the others being Iowa, 
Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah and 
Texas.)
By contrast, Dean LaFleur and 
Timothy Pfyer did have a formal 
ceremony in 2003, with vows before 
a clergyman, exchange of rings in the 
presence of family and friends, and a 
claim by Pyfer that he had proposed 
marriage to LaFleur and that LeFleur 
had accepted the proposal. The 
ceremony in Colorado was held shortly 
after the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge 
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 
309, 798 N.E.2d 941(2003), which 
recognized a right for same-sex couples 
to marry under that state’s constitution, 
the first such decision in the United 
States. Justice Marquez found this 
significant, since it suggested that a 
same-sex couple in 2003 could believe 
that a same-sex marriage was a legal 
possibility. As with Hogsett and Neale, 
LaFleur and Pyfer did not enter a formal 
legal marriage in Colorado when that 
became possible in 2014, and as their 
relationship had cooled off and Pyfer had 
a new boyfriend, he filed a dissolution 
petition in January 2018, claiming they 
had a common law marriage dating 
from the 2003 ceremony. Pyfer sought 
a property division and maintenance 
award from the court, which was 
probably a substantial motivation to file 
the lawsuit.
LaFleur denied the possibility that 
the ceremony they held in 2003 could 
have created a common law marriage, 
since “same sex marriages were not 
recognized or protected under Colorado 
law” then. The trial judge ruled for Pyfer, 
finding that Obergefell recognized 
an existing constitutional right, that 
the men had manifested mutual intent 
to marry in 2003, and that Pyfer was 
entitled to seek a dissolution. However, 
Pyfer was disappointed in how the trial 
court distributed assets and appealed, 
as LaFleur cross-appealed, insisting 
that there had been no common law 
marriage. The Colorado Supreme 
Court had already granted petitions 
for certiorari in Hogsett and Yudkin, 
so LaFleur petitioned the court to take 
this case directly, bypassing the court of 
appeals.
In LaFleur, the Supreme Court 
agreed with the trial judge, rejecting 
LaFleur’s argument that it was 
impossible for a common law marriage 
to be formed by a same-sex couple 
prior to October 2014. As the issue of 
Obergefell’s “retroactivity” was not 
contested by the parties in Hogsett, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in that 
case focused on modifying the Lucero 
factors to reflect modern reality. Lucero 
was a criminal prosecution in which the 
issue of spousal testimonial privilege 
turned on whether the court found a 
common law marriage to exist. “In 
Lucero,” wrote Justice Marquez, “we 
held that a couple could establish a 
common law marriage ‘by the mutual 
consent or agreement of the parties to be 
husband and wife, followed by a mutual 
and open assumption of a marital 
relationship.’ We directed that evidence 
of such agreement and conduct could 
be found in a couple’s cohabitation; 
reputation in the community as 
husband and wife; maintenance of joint 
banking and credit accounts; purchase 
and joint ownership of property; filing 
of joint tax returns; and use of the man’s 
surname by the woman or by children 
born to the parties.” The trial courts had 
expressed frustration that this list of 
evidentiary factors did not fit very well 
in an analysis of a same-sex couple, and 
the Hogsett court pointedly asked for 
the Supreme Court to revisit the issue in 
light of changes since 1987, including, 
of course, Obergefell.
Justice Marquez acknowledged the 
need for a more expansive approach. She 
wrote that “the gender-differentiated 
terms and heteronormative assumptions 
of the Lucero test render it ill-suited for 
same-sex couples. More broadly, many 
of the traditional indicia of marriage 
identified in Lucero are no longer 
exclusive to marital relationships. 
At the same time, genuine marital 
relationships no longer necessarily bear 
Lucero’s traditional markers. The lower 
court decisions in these cases reflect the 
challenges of applying Lucero to these 
changed circumstances.”
“In this case,” Marquez continued, 
“we refine the test from Lucero and 
hold that a common law marriage may 
be established by the mutual consent 
or agreement of the couple to enter the 
legal and social institution of marriage, 
followed by conduct manifesting that 
mutual agreement. The core query is 
whether the parties intended to enter a 
marital relationship — that is, to share a 
life together as spouses in a committed, 
intimate relationship of mutual support 
and obligation. In assessing whether 
a common law marriage has been 
established, courts should accord weight 
to evidence reflecting a couple’s express 
agreement to marry. In the absence of 
such evidence, the parties’ agreement 
to enter a marital relationship may be 
inferred from their conduct. When 
examining the parties’ conduct, the 
factors identified in Lucero can still be 
relevant to the inquiry, but they must be 
assessed in context; the inferences to be 
drawn from the parties’ conduct may 
vary depending on the circumstances. 
Finally, the manifestation of the parties’ 
agreement to marry need not take a 
particular form.”
However, under this new 
formulation, the court agreed with the 
trial judge that Hogsett had failed to 
prove a common-law marriage, mainly 
because Neale’s credible testimony 
undercut the contention that there was a 
mutual agreement to marry (or to enter 
a spousal-type relationship as described 
by the court), and the ring exchange 
in the gay bar, when set against all 
the credible testimony, did not convey 
the same import of mutual agreement 
as the formal wedding ceremony of 
Pyfer and LaFleur. On the other hand, 
having set out this new formulation 
of the potentially relevant evidentiary 
factors, the court concluded that Pyfer 
had succeeded in proving a common 
law marriage with LaFleur. The court 
agreed with Pyfer, as well, that the 
trial judge had erred in dividing the 
assets upon dissolution, failing to 
make findings of fact that are normally 
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required and giving weight to factors 
that should not be relevant, so the case 
was remanded for reconsideration of 
the asset distribution.
The court was by no means 
unanimous in all the holdings in the 
same-sex couple cases. Justice Carlos 
S. Samour entered a vigorous dissent in 
LaFleur, agreeing with Dean LeFleur 
that Obergefell could not be applied 
retroactively in this way. “Is it possible 
for a same-sex couple in Colorado to have 
mutually intended and agreed to enter 
into a legal marital relationship when 
both parties were aware that Colorado 
law prohibited same-sex marriage 
at the time? The answer is clearly 
no,” he asserted. “When Pyfer and 
LaFleur participated in their wedding 
ceremony in November 2003, they 
both understood that same-sex couples 
could not lawfully marry in Colorado 
because Colorado considered same-sex 
marriages unlawful, unenforceable, and 
invalid. Thus, Pyfer and LaFleur could 
not possible have intended or agreed 
to enter into the legal relationship of 
marriage. And because common law 
marriage in Colorado requires mutual 
intent and agreement to enter into the 
legal relationship of marriage, Pyfer 
and LaFleur cannot be deemed to have 
entered into a common law marriage.” 
In Hogsett, Justice Samour concurred 
in the judgment only, finding that the 
women did not have a common law 
marriage.
Justice Melissa Hart, concurring 
in Hogsett, wrote that she was joining 
the majority opinions in the three cases 
“because the opinions offer helpful 
refinement of the common law marriage 
test to be applied to those common 
law marriages that have already been 
entered.” But she offered a separate 
opinion to state her agreement with 
the judge in the court of appeals who 
thought that “Colorado should join the 
overwhelming majority of states” and 
abolish common law marriage going 
forward. “The historic conditions that 
once justified the need for the doctrine 
are no longer present,” she wrote, “its 
application is often unpredictable 
and inconsistent, and it ties parties 
and courts up in needlessly costly 
litigation.”
Chief Justice Brian Boatright also 
wrote separately, concurring in the 
judgments in both same-sex marriage 
cases, but expressing reservations 
about the majority’s approach. As far 
as he was concerned, the key finding 
in a common law marriage case had to 
be mutual intent and agreement to enter 
a marriage, which he found lacking in 
Hogsett and present in LaFleur. But, 
he insisted, the revision of the Lucero 
factors offered by the majority was 
unnecessary to decide these two cases 
and potentially problematic. “Today,” 
he wrote in Hogsett, “the majority 
announces new factors for establishing 
common law marriage even though 
those factors are ultimately irrelevant 
under the circumstances of this case.” 
Since the testimony at trial indicated 
lack of mutual intent to marry, he felt the 
court should have stopped right there 
and affirmed the trial court’s decision 
that the women did not have a common 
law marriage. “Thus, in my view,” he 
continued, “the majority decides more 
than is necessary because the record 
clearly evinces – without considering 
any factors – that no common law 
marriage existed. And in deciding what 
it need not, the majority also potentially 
broadens the definition of marriage in a 
way that I fear will only further confuse 
the already complex concept of common 
law marriage. Because I agree with the 
majority’s ultimate conclusion that Neale 
and Hogsett did not enter into a common 
law marriage, I respectfully concur in 
the judgment only.” And, in LaFleur, his 
concurrence insisted that “application 
of any factors is unnecessary because, 
in my view, the fact that Dean LaFleur 
and Timothy Pyfer had a ceremony that 
was – in every way – a wedding evinces 
their mutual intent to be married. In the 
simplest of terms, LaFleur and Pyfer are 
married because they had a wedding. 
I do agree with the majority, however, 
that the fundamental right to marry as 
outlined in Obergefell . . . ‘must be given 
retroactive effect.’” Thus, he agreed that 
LaFleur should be remanded only on 
the question of property division and 
spousal maintenance.
It will be interesting to see whether 
the Colorado legislature decides to enter 
the debate in this case by legislating 
to end common law marriage or, 
alternatively, codifying it in law with 
prescribed evidentiary requirements 
reflecting modern realities of family 
life. Chief Justice Boatright’s concern 
about the revised factors making the 
process of judicial determination of 
a common law marriage even more 
complicated than it had previously been 
under Lucero may well strike a chord. 
But any repeal of common law marriage 
would of necessity be prospective only, 
so same-sex couples who had attempted 
to formalize their relationships prior 
to Obergefell should still be able to 
present claims to the courts. As an 
example of this phenomenon, although 
Pennsylvania abolished common law 
marriage early in this century, their 
courts have evaluated claims concerning 
common law marriages of same-sex 
couples formed prior to the repeal. 
To do otherwise would raise serious 
due process concerns, since it would 
be difficult to argue that a state could 
legislatively repeal existing common 
law marriages when the right to marry 
has been deemed “fundamental” by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell.
Edi Hogsett is represented by 
Griffiths Law PC, Ann Gushurst, 
Littleton, CO; Radman Law Firm, 
LLC, Diane R. Radman, Denver, CO; 
and Aitken Law Firm, LLC, Sharlene 
J. Aitken, Denver, CO. Marcia Neale 
is represented by Plog & Stein, P.C., 
Jessica A. Saldin and Stephen J. 
Plog, Greenwood Village, CO. Dean 
LaFleur is represented by Antolinez 
Miller, LLC, Joseph H. Antolinez and 
Melissa Miller, Centennial, CO; and 
Azizour Donnelly, LLC, Katayoum A. 
Donnelly, Denver, CO. Timothy Pyfer 
is represented by Law Offices of Rodger 
C. Daley, Rodger C. Daley, Carrie 
Vonachen, and Dorian Geisler, Denver, 
CO; and Reilly LLP, John M. McHugh, 
Denver, CO. Amicus briefs were filed 
in both of these cases, including briefs 
from the Family Law Section of the 
Colorado State Bar and from LGBT 
rights groups: The Colorado LGBT Bar 
Association, the Colorado Women’s 
Bar Association, Lambda Legal, and 
the National Center for Lesbian Rights, 
with numerous cooperating attorneys 
listed on the briefs. ■
